The "transition happiness gap" has been one of the most robust findings in the life satisfaction literature. Until very recently, scholars using various datasets on life satisfaction have shown that residents of post-communist countries were significantly less satisfied with their lives than their counterparts in non-transition countries (controlling for income and other correlates of life satisfaction). The literature has explained this finding by the great macroeconomic instability of 1990s, by a substantial decrease in the quality and accessibility of public goods, by the major increase in inequality, and by the rapid depreciation of pre-transition human capital. All these factors were expected to subside over time -at least after the post-Great-Recession recovery. In this paper, we consider two most recent datasets -the third wave of the Life in Transition Survey (administered in 2015-16) and the 2010-2016 waves of the annual Gallup World Poll. We find that by 2016 the transition happiness gap had closed. This "happiness convergence" has taken place both due to a "happiness recovery" in post-communist countries after the Great Recession and due to a decrease in life satisfaction in comparator countries in recent years. We also find that the convergence in life satisfaction was primarily driven by middle-income young educated individuals, regardless of gender.
Introduction
Transition from planned to market economy has been a unique political, social and economic transformation undertaken in a relatively short period. In the last 25 years, the citizens of former communist countries have lived through a complete overhaul of public and social institutions, the emergence of a new private sector, and the re-integration into the global economy.
While there has been a significant divergence of transition trajectories (in particular, between central and eastern Europe on one hand, and the former Soviet Union on the other), academic research has identified one important common property shared by all post-communist countries: the so-called "transition happiness gap". Residents of former communist countries have been reporting significantly lower life satisfaction than their counterparts in countries with similar income levels that did not undergo transition from planned to market economy. Following the decline in incomes in the first years of transition and subsequent economic growth, life satisfaction also partially recovered after its initial fall (see Easterlin, 2014 and Inglehart et al., 2013) . However -until very recently -this recovery has not brought life satisfaction in transition countries up to the levels of countries with similar per capita incomes. * Why did residents of transition countries report lower life satisfaction? Economists have been able to identify several common factors contributing to the "transition happiness gap". East Europeans' lower life satisfaction may be explained by their dissatisfaction with their governments (Djankov et al., 2016) and their legal systems (Nikolova, 2016) . The transition happiness gap has also been related to the traumatic experience of macroeconomic instability of early transition, to deterioration of public goods, and increase in income inequality during the transition (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009 ). The happiness gap may have also been driven by the impact of depreciation of human capital stock accumulated under central planning: skills acquired before transition turned out to be less useful in the market economy (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009 ).
This analysis has predicted that the transition happiness gap should eventually disappear. † As the quality of public services improves and younger and newly educated cohorts enter the labour market, post-communist countries should be converging to their non-transition peers in terms of life satisfaction. This convergence has been delayed (or slowed down) by the Great Recession that has had a disproportionally strong impact on the post-communist countries. However, the post-crisis recovery and the introduction of the more resilient macroeconomic framework (macroprudential regulation and inflation targeting) should contribute to eliminating the transition happiness gap and prevent further large macroeconomic shocks in the future.
In this paper, we re-evaluate the impact of transition on life satisfaction using the newly available data from the third round of the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS III) and the 2010-16 waves of the annual Gallup World Poll. We find that the happiness gap has closed: the residents of post-communist countries are no longer less satisfied with life than their peers, living in countries that have similar levels of income but did not undergo the transition. We also find that this result is primarily driven by the convergence in life satisfaction among the younger cohorts.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the results and provides robustness checks. Section 4 concludes.
Data and methodology

Data
In this paper we use data from the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) and from the Gallup World Poll (GWP).
The LiTS has been conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and by the World Bank in 2006 (first wave), 2010 (second wave) and at the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016 (third wave). We will mostly use the third wave (LiTS III) which was administered in 29 former communist countries (excluding Turkmenistan) and 5 comparator countries (Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Italy and Turkey). More than 2,500 localities were visited, and more than 51,000 interviews were completed with randomly selected households. The survey was representative at the country level.
The survey includes questions on economic well-being, beliefs, attitudes, and life satisfaction. The latter is our main variable of interest. The respondents were asked whether they agreed with the statement "All things considered, I am satisfied with my life now". They could choose from five options: "strongly disagree", "disagree", "neither agree nor disagree", "agree", and "strongly agree", thus creating a five-point scale for the degree of life satisfaction. We have also created a binary measure of life satisfaction assuming that the respondents were satisfied with their life if they chose "agree", and "strongly agree" and dissatisfied with their life otherwise.
We also use the data from the 2010-16 waves of the annual GWP. We exclude the years prior to 2010 because all the variables of interest are available only for a limited number of countries. ‡ The data cover 31 post-communist countries and territories (including Nagorno-Karabakh) and 133 comparator countries with approximately 450,000 observations, for which we have all the variables of interest. For each country-year Gallup typically surveys 1,000 randomly selected individuals, constituting a nationally representative sample. § Similarly to LiTS, the GWP includes multiple questions on attitudes, beliefs, objective and perceived socio-economic well-being. Our main question of interest is formulated in the following way: "Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?". ‡ Only 17 post-communist countries have all the data for 2009; this number increases to 25 for 2010.
§ However, the residents of certain countries are not surveyed on an annual basis. For this reason, in some specifications we only consider a panel of countries, for which GWP has data for all years; this panel includes 23 post-communist countries and 40 non-transition countries. The full list of countries for which all the data are available in a given year is presented in the appendix.
Methodology
Our analysis of the transition happiness gap is based on the conventional econometric model of life satisfaction:
where the measure of life satisfaction for individual i in country c is regressed on an indicator that takes the value of one if c is a former communist country and on a vector of individual characteristics that capture the conventional determinants of life satisfaction (Clark et al., 2017 ) that can be proxied by variables available in LiTS and GWP. These include age and age squared (or birth-year fixed effects), as well as income, education, gender, marital status, the number of children in the household, urban rather than rural residence, and employment status. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
The coefficient β represents the effect of living in a former communist country on life satisfaction (controlling for conventional individual-and household-level determinants of happiness). If β is negative and significant, this means that the "transition happiness gap" is still present; if there is no significant negative effect, then the gap has closed.
We also consider the following modifications of the model:
where B represents various groups of birth years (or age), I -income groups, G -gender, and E denotes the highest level of education, completed by the respondent. This setting allows us to study, whether or not the closing of the transition happiness gap was uniform across age, education, and income categories. Chart 2 shows that the "happiness convergence" has taken place due to both the substantial increase in life satisfaction in most former communist countries and the decrease in life satisfaction in comparator countries between 2010 and 2016. In Germany and Turkey, life satisfaction has declined despite income growth. In Italy life satisfaction declined alongside the fall in GDP per capita but the decrease in life satisfaction was more pronounced than the fall in GDP would predict. Greece and Cyprus were not covered by LiTS in 2010 but their current life satisfaction levels are lower than their per capita incomes would suggest. This stands in stark contrast with the picture in 2010: relative to transition countries, life satisfaction in all Western countries was significantly higher than their income would suggest (except for Italy where life satisfaction was on the trend line).
Taken together, these results can be interpreted in the following way. In 2010, the transition happiness gap was still present. It may well be the case that it could have disappeared already by 2010 as was predicted by the literature but the disproportionally high impact of the Great Recession on the former communist countries resulted in a pronounced negative effect on life satisfaction (EBRD, 2016, ch.1 Chart 1: Life satisfaction by region, LiTS
Source: LiTS III and authors' calculations. Notes: The chart shows the percentage of respondents that agree or strongly agree with the statement "All things considered, I am satisfied with my life now". The blue bars indicate simple regional averages. The red bars indicate the level of life satisfaction adjusted for individual and household characteristics (see Table 1 ). The average for SEE does not include Cyprus and Greece, which are shown separately with Turkey in the last two bars.
The absence of the transition happiness gap shown in the Chart 2 is confirmed by econometric tests. These tests (reported in Table 1 ) are based on a conventional model of life satisfaction (1). Several proxies for income are also included: self-reported household income and answers to the questions whether the household can afford holidays and meat, chicken or fish and whether the household can afford unexpected expenses. Table 1 reports the results for the binary measure of life satisfaction (whether the respondent is satisfied with life or not); the results for a five-point measure of life satisfaction are very similar (we report them in section 3.3).
The effects of the variables above are intuitive and consistent with what has been discovered in previous literature on life satisfaction. Each additional level of education (that is, moving from no education to primary education, from primary to secondary, and from secondary to tertiary) increases the probability of being satisfied with life by 5-10 percentage points. Being unemployed decreases life satisfaction by 12-19 percentage points. A 10 per cent rise in income increases the probability of being satisfied with life by 1 percentage point. Women are 2-3 percentage points happier than men. Married individuals are 2 percentage points more likely to be satisfied with life than single ones, while those who are divorced or separated are 4-7 percentage points less likely to be happy. Each additional child increases happiness by 2-3 percentage points. The effect of age is non-linear -for those under 50 life satisfaction decreases with age while for those after 50 years it starts to increase with age. (Table 1 presents the results with linear and squared terms for age; the results with birth year dummies are very similar.)
The main variable of interest in Table 1 is residence in a post-communist country. In none of the specifications is the coefficient of this variable statistically significant. This means that life satisfaction in post-communist countries is the same as in comparator countries in the sample (controlling for other individual-level or household-level determinants of life satisfaction). Columns (1.1)-(1.3) compare post-communist countries with western Europe (Germany and Italy). Column (1.1) reports the results without controlling for respondents' income. In this specification, life satisfaction in Germany and Italy is 5 percentage points higher but the effect is not statistically significant. Once income is controlled for, there is no difference in life satisfaction between Western and post-communist countries (columns (1.2)-(1.3)).
Columns (1.4) and (1.5) compare post-communist countries with all the five comparator countries in the sample (Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Italy and Turkey). On average, life satisfaction in post-communist countries is higher than in these five countries (especially controlling for income). However, the effect is not significant. All specifications above include the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; a model excluding these countries produces similar results. Table 2 demonstrates how life satisfaction has changed since the second round of the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS II) that was carried out in 2010. Columns (2.1) and (2.2) reproduce the cross-section results for LiTS II and III, respectively, while column (2.3) reports the results for the pooled cross-section of LiTS II and III. Comparator countries include France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom for LiTS II; Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Italy and Turkey for LiTS III. Columns (2.4)-(2.6) reproduce the same regressions but consider only for a panel of primary sampling units (PSUs) which have observations for both 2010 and 2016. This automatically creates a panel of countries, consisting of 29 post-communist countries and three comparator countries (Germany, Italy, and Turkey). Finally, column (2.7) reports the results for the same Notes: Linear probability model. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In all the regressions we control for log household income, employment status, gender, age group, the highest completed level of education, the number of children, marital status, religion, urban/rural status, and log GDP per capita. The coefficients for these variables are statistically significant and similar to those reported in Table 1 . For LiTS III income is self-reported in local currency and then converted to US dollars. For LiTS II income is calculated as the sum of reported spending and savings and then converted to US dollars. The Number of children is the number of children under 18 currently living in the house. LiTS II has data only on the age group of the respondents; LiTS III data are adjusted accordingly. Specifications (2.1)-(2.3) include 29 post-communist countries and all the comparator countries for each respective dataset. Specifications (2.4)-(2.6) include a panel of primary sampling units (PSUs) which were present both in LiTS II and in LiTS III. These cover 29 post-communist countries, Germany, Italy and Turkey. The final specification (2.7) considers the panel of PSUs and adds PSU fixed effects. regression as in (2.6), additionally controlling for PSU fixed effects. || The results confirm the closing of the transition happiness gap in 2016. Notably, columns (2.4)-(2.6) are very similar to columns (2.1)-(2.4), although the former consider a panel of PSUs. Columns (2.4)-(2.5) show that while in 2010 the residents of post-communist countries were 22 percentage points less likely to be satisfied with life than the residents of Germany, Italy, and Turkey, by 2016 this difference had disappeared. In turn, columns (2.6)-(2.7) suggest that the convergence was achieved due to a substantial decrease in life satisfaction in non-transition countries, while the residents of post-communist countries either experienced a decrease of smaller magnitude or did not experience it at all.
Overall, these results imply that in terms of life satisfaction, there is no longer a statistically significant difference between countries that have experienced transition from planned to market economy and those that have not.
Results from the Gallup World Poll
While LiTS includes almost every single post-communist country in each wave (except Turkmenistan), its set of comparator countries is very small. In particular, when we consider a panel of PSUs, such data are available only for Germany, Italy and Turkey. In turn, the data from the Gallup World Poll allow us to confirm our findings for a wider range of non-transition countries. ** Because our aim is to compare life satisfaction across countries with similar income levels, we only consider countries with PPP-adjusted GDP per capita no greater that US$ 35,000, a level that has never yet been reached by any post-communist country, although the Czech Republic is close with a GDP per capita of US$ 34,700. † † Given this specification, the || The small number of observations for LiTS II is explained by the fact that in 2010 the respondents were not asked a direct question about the income of their household. Instead, income is calculated as the sum of reported savings and expenses on several categories of goods and services. To make the data comparable across observations, income is coded as missing if the answer to at least one of those questions is not present. ** The exact number depends on the specification. However, even in the most restrictive cases, there are 40 non-transition countries with levels of development comparable to those of the post-communist countries.
† † We discuss the comparisons with rich countries in section 3.3.
Chart 3: Life satisfaction and GDP per capita in transition and comparator countries, GWP Source: Gallup World Poll, World Development Indicators and authors' calculations. Notes: The vertical axis shows the average response the residents of a country give to the question "Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?". The horizontal axis shows the GDP per capita in PPP terms (constant 2016 international dollars) in logarithmic scale. Post-communist countries are labelled, dots represent comparator countries. The solid line represents the linear relationship, while the dashed line represents the nonparametric, locally weighted regressions (lowess). Each part of the chart considers a cross-section of countries with income levels similar to post-communist countries.
comparator group includes more than 40 countries, even if we require the data for them to be available during all the years from 2010 to 2016. Without this restriction, the number of comparator countries increases to more than 60.
Chart 3 presents the linear and non-linear non-parametric (lowess) relationship between average life satisfaction and GDP per capita among transition and non-transition countries for 2010 and 2016. While in 2010 the vast majority of post-communist countries were below the trend line, this was no longer the case in 2016. In fact, half post-communist countries experienced lower life satisfaction than predicted by their income, while the other half was above the trend line. ‡ ‡ Given the Gallup World Poll is conducted annually, we can also track the evolution of the transition happiness gap over time. In order to do so, we estimate model (1) for each year from 2010 to 2016. The results are reported in Table 3 .
The results presented in Table 3 are consistent with those from the LiTS: we find that in 2010 residents of post-communist countries still remained less satisfied with life than the residents of comparator countries, but by 2016 this difference had disappeared. The closing of the transition happiness gap is estimated to have taken place in 2011-13, depending on the exact formulation of the econometric model. In the standard specification we consider all the countries for which the data are available in a given year, regardless of whether the data are available in other years. These results are presented in columns (3.1)-(3.7). We also run the same regressions for the subset of countries with data available for each year 2010-16 (the respective results are presented in columns (3.8)-(3.14)). The results do not change. If anything, the transition happiness gap is estimated to close a year earlier if such a panel is considered.
Chart 4 depicts the evolution of the transition happiness gap from 2010 to 2016, using the results from columns (3.1)-(3.7). The solid line represents the absolute value of the difference between life ‡ ‡ Chart 3 includes all the countries with data available for 2010 and/or 2016. In the appendix, we show that the chart for the panel of countries (that is, the subset of countries surveyed both in 2010 and 2016) is similar. satisfaction for post-communist and comparator countries, while the dashed lines denote the boundaries of the 95 per cent confidence interval.
Heterogeneous effects
Transition happiness gap by age cohorts
In this subsection, we explore whether or not the closure of the transition happiness gap was uniform across age groups and birth cohorts.
In order to address this question we first consider model (1) simultaneously for 2010 and 2016, excluding the indicator for residence in a post-communist country, age and age squared from the regression, and then non-parametrically assess the size of the residual for transition and comparator countries for each birth year using locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (lowess). Thus, the difference between the two curves denotes the transition happiness gap for a given birth year. In turn, as we simultaneously include observations for 2010 and 2016, the residual curves can also be compared across years, allowing us to assess the change in life satisfaction for a particular age group both in transition and non-transition countries. The results are presented in Chart 5 with the solid and dashed lines corresponding to the residents of post-communist and comparator countries respectively. § § We find that by 2010 the transition happiness gap had already disappeared for the younger cohorts (this is perfectly consistent with Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009) . If anything, residents of post-communist countries born after 1990 were slightly more satisfied with life that their peers from countries that did not experience the transition. However, the gap was present and very large for the older generations, following a U-shape with the lowest point at the birth year of 1947 -the cohort that turned 63 in 2010. The non-transition countries' age profile of life satisfaction also has a U-shape form with the minimum reached somewhere between 30 and 40 years of age -and a much smaller gap in happiness between young and middle-aged. § § Here and further in this section we report the results for the panel of countries with data from 2010 to 2016. 
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In all the regressions we additionally control for the number of children, marital status, religion, and the country's involvement in a military conflict or war. All these specifications consider countries that have GDP per capita no higher than US$ 35,000 (PPP, 2016).
Chart 5 1996 1991-1996 1985-1990 1979-1984 1973-1978 1967-1972 1961-1966 1955-1960 1949-1954 < 1949 THG (2010 In all the regressions we additionally control for log household income per capita, employment status, education level, log GDP per capita, urban/rural status, gender, the number of children, marital status, religion, and the country's involvement in a military conflict or war. The coefficients for these variables are significant and similar to those reported in Table 3 . We consider all countries that have GDP per capita no higher than US$ 35,000 (PPP, 2016) as comparators.
The second part of Chart 5 shows that by 2016 the curve for post-communist countries had shifted to the right and become slightly flatter, while the curve for non-transition countries had shifted downwards, denoting a general decrease in life satisfaction. As a result, the birth year with a zero transition happiness gap shifted from 1987 to 1970 and all individuals generally experienced a convergence in life satisfaction. The noticeable downwards shift of the curve for non-transition countries suggests that the residents of these countries experienced a decrease in life satisfaction. In turn, the curve for post-communist countries remained practically the same as in 2010.
The findings presented in Chart 5 are confirmed when we estimate the size of the transition happiness gap for various birth year cohorts. Specifically, we consider model (1), including age and age squared but adding an additional interaction term of 1 {birth year group} ic · 1 {post-communist country} c . Thus, the results can be directly compared with those in Table 3 . We use six-year birth-year group in order to facilitate the comparisons across waves by both birth-year and age (for example, the cohort born in 1985-90 had the same age in 2010 as the next cohort -born in 1991-96 -when surveyed in 2016). Table 4 presents our findings. ¶ ¶ By 2010 the transition happiness gap had fully closed only for individuals born in 1979 or later. All the other residents of post-communist countries remained significantly less satisfied with life that ¶ ¶ We only report the results related to residence in a post-communist country. The coefficients and standard errors for the other variables are very similar to those reported in Table 3 . In all the regressions we additionally control for log household income per capita, employment status, education level, log GDP per capita, urban/rural status, gender, age, age squared, the number of children, marital status, religion, and the country's involvement in a military conflict or war. The coefficients for these variables are significant and similar to those reported in Table 3 . We consider all countries that have GDP per capita no higher than US$ 35,000 (PPP, 2016) as comparators.
their non-transition peers with the gap reaching its maximum for the birth year around 1950. In turn, by 2016 a significant difference in life satisfaction had persisted only for individuals born around 1950, although the gap had only narrowly closed for adjacent age groups. Therefore, the convergence in happiness took place across nearly all age groups, although for the old this result is both less prominent and less robust. This result is not surprising because, as suggested by Chart 5, the closure of the gap in life satisfaction was mainly driven by the residents of comparator countries becoming less happy, regardless of age group.
The specifications used in Table 4 and Chart 5 are slightly different. Table 4 presents the results of separate cross-sectional estimations for 2010 and 2016 while Chart 5 is based on a pooled regression for both years. Nonetheless, Table 4 confirms findings of Chart 5, suggesting that the closure of the transition happiness gap had taken place for most age groups.
Transition happiness gap by education categories
We now consider the role of education in closing the transition happiness gap. As in the case of age, our main question is whether or not the change in the happiness gap was uniform across education levels. To address this question we begin with considering model (1) with an additional interaction term 1 {post-communist country} c · 1 {tertiary education} ic . Table 5 presents the results for the years 2010-16.
If the transition happiness gap were systematically larger or smaller for the better educated, the coefficient for the interaction term would have been significant. However, as shown in Table 5 , this is not the case: the coefficient is not statistically significant in every year. This suggests that on average the return to education in post-communist and comparator countries was the same during all the years and that convergence in life satisfaction was uniform across education levels.
Nonetheless, the average effect hides the heterogeneity in terms of the impact of education across age groups. In order to analyse this heterogeneity, we compare the residual of life satisfaction across birth year cohorts for individuals with and without tertiary education. As in Chart 5, we exclude the dummy for residence in a post-communist country and all the age variables and estimate model (1), simultaneously for 2010 and 2016; then non-parametrically assess the size of the residual for transition and non-transition countries for each birth year. In order to understand the role of education, we consider separately the average residuals for two subsets: individuals with and without tertiary education. Our estimates are displayed in Chart 6. We should emphasise that in order to make Charts 5 and 6 comparable, we consider the residuals after controlling for the same set of correlates of life satisfaction -including tertiary education itself. Therefore the residuals do not include the average direct impact of education on life satisfaction (as estimated for the whole sample). Because of the small number of individuals with tertiary education who were born before 1940, we exclude earlier birth years from the analysis.
The results are as follows. First and foremost, in all graphs the residuals for individuals with and without tertiary education are very similar -suggesting that the effect of education on happiness is virtually uniform for all cohorts in transition and non-transition countries. The exceptions are the very young and very old cohorts. But as the last pair of graphs shows, these cohorts are not very representative: there are very few college-educated individuals among the very young and there are disproportionally many individuals with tertiary education among the very old. The latter effect may be driven by a positive correlation between education and life expectancy.
In 2010 the curves for the residual of life satisfaction almost perfectly coincided for individuals born between 1955 and 1980, regardless of whether they lived in transition or non-transition countries. This suggests that across these birth year cohorts the effect of education on life satisfaction is homogeneous and accurately estimated by model (1) for both types of countries. In turn, the return to education was considerably lower for the young (born after 1980) in post-communist countries, while the opposite was true in comparator countries. Similarly, educated individuals born before 1955 experienced lower levels of life satisfaction when living in transition countries and higher levels of life satisfaction when living in non-transition countries, although in the latter case the gap was less prominent.
By 2016 the following changes had taken place. For post-communist countries the effect of a university degree had become more homogeneous across birth year cohorts with the gap for the young and the old becoming considerably narrower. Only the young still experienced a slightly lower return to education. In comparator countries the effect of a university degree also generally became more homogeneous for individuals born after 1960. In particular, the return to education decreased for the young, while it remained the same for the middle-aged. However, the effect of a university degree substantially increased for the generations born before 1960.
We further compare the residual curves across time. In post-communist countries the curve for educated individuals had shifted upwards, denoting an increase in life satisfaction, while the curve for the uneducated ones remained the same for the middle-aged and shifted downwards for the young and the old. At the same time, in comparator countries both curves shifted downwards for all age groups except for the older cohorts with tertiary education. In terms of the transition happiness gap, these results imply that, apart from the general convergence by birth year cohorts discussed in the previous section, by 2016 the gap had narrowed substantially for young individuals with tertiary education. This convergence was driven both by an increase in the return to education in post-communist countries and a respective decrease for comparator countries. Furthermore, the results imply that the transition happiness gap generally narrowed for the educated individuals, except those born before 1960. In turn, uneducated individuals experienced little convergence in life satisfaction (with the possible exception of the middle-aged).
Our conclusions are confirmed when we reproduce the same regressions as in Table 4 separately for individuals with and without tertiary education. Table 6 presents the results.
Most notably, although the transition happiness gap had already closed by 2010 for the younger generations when all education levels were considered, it remained present for individuals with tertiary education. Moreover, the gap was very large in magnitude, corresponding to nearly 1.3 steps on the 10-step happiness ladder for individuals born after 1990. By 2016 this gap had closed and the educated young in post-communist countries were no longer less satisfied with life than their peers in comparator countries. 1996 1991-1996 1985-1990 1979-1984 1973-1978 1967-1972 1961-1966 1955-1960 1949-1954 < 1949 THG (2010) 1996 1991-1996 1985-1990 1979-1984 1973-1978 1967-1972 1961-1966 1955-1960 1949-1954 < 1949 THG (2010 In all the regressions we additionally control for log household income per capita, employment status, education level, log GDP per capita, urban/rural status, gender, the number of children, marital status, religion, and the country's involvement in a military conflict or war. The coefficients for these variables are significant and similar to those reported in Table 3 . We consider all countries that have GDP per capita no higher than US$ 35,000 (PPP, 2016) as comparators.
In other respects Table 6 also confirms the findings of Chart 6. In particular, although all educated individuals born after 1954 experienced convergence in life satisfaction, the transition happiness gap persisted for the older cohorts with higher education. In turn, the gap only slightly narrowed for the uneducated, although it should be noted that in 2010 it had already been considerably smaller than for individuals with tertiary education.
Overall, we conclude that the convergence in life satisfaction was primarily driven by educated individuals, especially the young. As discussed in Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009) , this may be explained by the fact that the younger cohorts received their education after the transition to market economy; this education was probably more suitable for the needs of the market economy.
Transition happiness gap by gender
In this subsection we explore the evolution of the transition happiness gap by gender. Following an approach similar to the one above, we begin by excluding the dummy for residence in a post-communist country and replacing it with two interaction terms 1 {post-communist country} c · 1 {female} ic and 1 {post-communist country} c · 1 {male} ic . Thus, we are able to separately estimate the transition happiness gap for the male and female population. The results are presented in Table 7 .
We find that the female population of post-communist countries used to be significantly less satisfied with life that their counterparts in comparator countries. In particular, by 2010 the transition happiness gap had already closed for the male part of the population. In turn, for women the gap still persisted, allowing us to conclude that the overall transition happiness gap was primarily determined by females.
By 2016 both men and women had experienced further convergence in life satisfaction. In particular, the transition happiness gap for women had closed thus also driving its closure for the entire population as well.
Notably, the sum of coefficients for being female and being female in a transition country is always almost perfectly equal to the coefficient for being male in a transition country. Thus, while in comparator countries women were on average happier than men, in post-communist countries the Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all the regressions we additionally control for log household income per capita, employment status, education level, log GDP per capita, urban/rural status, gender, age, age squared, the number of children, marital status, religion, and the country's involvement in a military conflict or war. The coefficients for these variables are significant and similar to those reported in Table 3 . We consider all countries that have GDP per capita no higher than US$ 35,000 (PPP, 2016) as comparators.
respective levels of life satisfaction were practically identical. This relationship is present for all the years in our sample with the possible exception of 2014 and 2015, suggesting that the convergence in life satisfaction was uniform across gender.
We next estimate the size of the transition happiness gap by birth year cohorts separately for the male and female population. The results are presented in Table 8 .
Confirming the results of Table 7 , in 2010 the transition happiness gap was large and significant for all female cohorts except the very young, while for men is was present only for the old and was considerably smaller. In particular, only men born before 1961 experienced significantly lower levels of life satisfaction in post-communist countries than comparator countries. For women the gap was present for all cohorts born before 1985.
By 2016 practically all individuals experienced some convergence in life satisfaction, regardless of gender. Moreover, this convergence was virtually uniform for the young and middle-aged individuals of both genders. However, the transition happiness gap had decreased substantially for the old male population (born before 1955), whereas for old women it remained the same as in 2010.
Summing up, we find that in 2010 the overall transition happiness gap mainly persisted due to its presence for the female part of the population; for men the gap had already closed. By 2016 nearly all individuals had experienced convergence in life satisfaction, regardless of age and gender, and the transition happiness gap was no longer statistically significant for women. The only part of the population that did not contribute to the closure of the gap were women born before 1955. We also note that while in 2010-16 females living in comparator countries were significantly happier than men, in post-communist countries life satisfaction remained approximately the same across the genders.
Transition happiness gap by income level
We further examine whether the closure of the transition happiness gap was homogeneous across income levels. In order to understand whether the happiness convergence has been driven by richer or poorer households, we compare the residuals of life satisfaction across income levels for post-communist and comparator countries. In particular, we estimate model (1) simultaneously for 2010 and 2016, excluding log household income per capita and the dummy for residence in a 1996 1991-1996 1985-1990 1979-1984 1973-1978 1967-1972 1961-1966 1955-1960 1949-1954 < 1949 THG (2010 1996 1991-1996 1985-1990 1979-1984 1973-1978 1967-1972 1961-1966 1955-1960 1949-1954 < 1949 THG (2010 Source: Gallup World Poll, World Development Indicators and authors' calculations. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all the regressions we additionally control for log household income per capita, employment status, education level, log GDP per capita, urban/rural status, gender, the number of children, marital status, religion, and the country's involvement in a military conflict or war. The coefficients for these variables are significant and similar to those reported in Table 3 . We consider all countries that have GDP per capita no higher than US$ 35,000 (PPP, 2016) as comparators.
transition country, and then plot the non-parametric relationship between the residual and log household income per capita for post-communist and comparator countries. Our findings are presented in Chart 7. *** Similarly to Chart 5 above, the vertical distance between the curves in Chart 7 represents the transition happiness gap for a given income level.
In 2010 the transition happiness gap for the poorest individuals (income per capita ≤ US$ 1,100 or log income per capita ≤ 7) was quite small, corresponding to 0.2-0.25 points on the 10-step happiness ladder. For the middle part of the income distribution in the transition region (household income per capita between US$ 1,100 and US$ 8,100 or log household income per capita between 7 and 9), constituting almost 68 per cent of the population in post-communist countries, the gap widened considerably to half a step on the happiness ladder. However, for the richest individuals the gap again narrowed considerably, fully closing for individuals with income per capita of US$ 20,000 and higher (log income per capita ≥ 10).
By 2016 post-communist countries had experienced an increase in the life satisfaction of the middle-income individuals, while for the poor and the rich the average residual did not change. In turn, comparator countries experienced a decline in life satisfaction for all income levels except for the very rich, resulting in the closure of the transition happiness gap for all income levels. In particular, middle-income individuals in post-communist countries almost fully converged in terms of life satisfaction with their non-transition peers.
It is also important to emphasise that by 2016 the post-communist countries had arrived at a linear relationship between logarithm of per capita income and life satisfaction characteristic for non-transition countries and the world as a whole (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008) . While as recently as in 2010 this relationship exhibited "increasing marginal happiness returns to income" in transition countries, now the relationship is linear and its slope is the same as in the rest of the world.
To confirm the findings shown in Chart 7, we carry out an econometric estimation of the size of the transition happiness gap for various income levels. Similarly to the case of age and education, we consider model (1), excluding the dummy for residence in a post-communist country but *** Because of the small number of individuals in post-communist countries with log household income per capita below 5 or above 10.5 (income per capita below US$ 148 or above US$ 36,300), we exclude these observations from the analysis. Together these observations constitute less that 1 per cent of the sample population of post-communist countries. additionally including the interaction term of 1 {income group} ic · 1 {post-communist country} c . Table 9 presents the results.
As suggested by Chart 7, in 2010 the transition happiness gap was largest for individuals with log household income per capita between 7.5 and 9. For all other income levels the gap had already closed. In turn, by 2016 the levels of life satisfaction in post-communist and comparator countries had further converged. Most notably, the transition happiness gap had disappeared for middle-income individuals.
Overall, we find that the transition happiness gap had previously been primarily determined by middle-income individuals, constituting a significant part of the population. By 2016 the gap had closed for these income levels, contributing to the general convergence in life satisfaction in post-communist and comparator countries.
Robustness checks
Considering robustness checks, we begin with re-estimating the regressions of Table 1 , using a five-point scale for the degree of life satisfaction. The results are presented in Table 10 and are very In all the regressions we additionally control for log household income per capita, employment status, education level, log GDP per capita, urban/rural status, gender, the number of children, marital status, religion, and the country's involvement in a military conflict or war. The coefficients for these variables are significant and similar to those reported in Table 3 . We consider all countries that have GDP per capita no higher than US$ 35,000 (PPP, 2016) as comparators. similar those reported in Table 1 .
We further consider data from the Gallup World Poll, including all the available countries as comparators instead of limiting the sample to countries with GDP per capita below US$ 35,000. Columns (11.1)-(11.7) of Table 11 reproduce the results of Table 3 , using the panel for this new set of comparators.
When rich comparator countries are included in the regression, the transition happiness gap is no longer estimated to have fully closed, although it had narrowed substantially. More precisely, even though the gap was no longer significant in 2012-14, it reappeared in 2015-16 . However, this difference in results is fully explained by the fact that residents of rich countries are considerably more satisfied with life than their peers in poorer countries, even controlling for log household income per capita and GDP per capita. Notably, although GDP per capita was never significant in columns (3.8)-(3.14), it became highly significant in columns (11.1)-(11.7), suggesting that the new set of comparator countries requires additional control variables to explain the differences in life satisfaction. The return to income is also estimated to be considerably higher in columns (11.1)-(11.7) than in Table 3 , suggesting that the relationship between income and life satisfaction in rich countries is different from the respective relationship for poorer countries.
Chart 8 provides further evidence for this conclusion. Similarly to Chart 3, it plots the relationship between average life satisfaction and the level of GDP per capita, now additionally including rich non-transition countries. A separate linear trend is added for countries with GDP per capita above and below US$ 35,000, as well as a non-parametric (lowess) estimate of the respective relationship.
We find a discontinuous increase in life satisfaction after a country reaches the level of GDP per capita of US$ 35,000 (which corresponds to a steep increase in the case of non-parametric estimation). This suggests that the residents of rich countries are considerably happier than predicted by their income; therefore it is problematic to use them as comparators when estimating the transition happiness gap.
Regression analysis also shows that life satisfaction in rich countries is considerably higher than in other non-transition countries. We estimate the following model. Using all the same variables as in model (1), we additionally include a dummy for residence in a country that had GDP per capita larger than US$ 35,000 in 2010-16. Thus, the coefficient for the latter represents the difference in life satisfaction between non-transition countries with high and low income levels. To make interpretation easier, we exclude countries that had GDP per capita both above and below the respective cut-off level during the considered time period. The results are presented in columns Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table 10 reproduces the results of Table 1 , using a 5-point scale of life satisfaction instead of the binary measure. The income is selfreported in local currency and then converted to US dollars. In all regressions we additionally control for religion; the coefficients at these variables are statistically significant. Number of children is number of children under 18 currently living in the house. Specifications (11.8)-(11.14) of Table 11 .
We find that residents of rich countries are significantly more satisfied with life than their peers in other non-transition countries. Moreover, the respective coefficient is quite large, representing approximately half a step on the 10 step happiness ladder. This is nearly twice the size of the transition happiness gap at its peak in 2010. Therefore, we conclude that the reappearance of a small transition happiness gap, reported in columns (11.1)-(11.7), was primarily driven by the particularly high levels of life satisfaction in rich countries rather than by the low levels of happiness in 
Concluding remarks
Using newly available data from the third round of the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS III) and the 2010-16 waves of the annual Gallup World Poll, we re-examine the impact of transition on life satisfaction. We find that residents of post-communist countries are no longer less satisfied with life than residents of other countries with similar income levels: the transition happiness gapconsistently reported in previous studies -has finally closed. The closing is estimated to have taken place in 2012-13.
Our analysis also suggests that the convergence in life satisfaction was primarily driven by the younger and middle-age cohorts. If in 2010 the transition happiness gap was not present only for individuals aged 24 and younger, by 2016 the gap had closed for all the cohorts that were younger than 45. The older generations, living in post-communist countries, are still significantly less satisfied with life than their peers in comparator countries, although the difference has become substantially smaller as well.
We also investigate the return to education in transition countries. On average, we find no significant difference between individuals with and without higher education in terms of happiness convergence. However, there is an important interaction between the effects of education and age: happiness convergence has been driven by younger cohorts with higher education. These individuals received their education after the transition to market. This result is consistent with a "human capital depreciation" argument that conjectures that recent graduates have received skills that were more suitable for the needs of the market economy.
We also find that in transition countries women and men have had very similar levels of life satisfaction, while in comparator countries women have consistently been happier than men. In turn, this resulted in a wider transition happiness gap for the female population. Although this gap is no longer significant for women in general, the older generations remain considerably less satisfied with life than their counterparts in non-transition countries, with no convergence having taken place. For all other individuals, the closure of transition happiness gap was approximately uniform, regardless of gender or age.
Last but not least, we find that the relationship between (logarithm) of household per capita income and life satisfaction in post-communist countries has become linear -with the same slope as in non-transition countries. This may be interpreted as yet another piece of evidence that the "happiness transition" has finally been completed. 
B: Charts
Panel (B)
Source: Gallup World Poll, World Development Indicators and authors' calculations.
Panel (A) Notes:
The vertical axis shows the average response the residents of a country give to the question "Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?". The horizontal axis shows the GDP per capita in PPP terms (constant 2016 international dollars) in logarithmic scale. Post-communist countries are labelled, dots represent comparator countries. The solid line represents the linear relationship between GDP per capita and life satisfaction; the dashed line represents the non-parametric, locally weighted regressions (lowess). Each part of the chart considers a panel of countries for which the data are available in 2010-16 with income levels similar to post-communist countries. Panel (B) Notes: The vertical axis shows the average response the residents of a country give to the question "Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?". The horizontal axis shows the GDP per capita in PPP terms (constant 2016 international dollars) in logarithmic scale. Post-communist countries are labelled, dots represent comparator countries. The solid lines represent the linear relationships for countries with GDP per capita above and below US$ 35,000; the dashed line represents the non-parametric, locally weighted regressions (lowess). Each part of the figure considers a panel of countries for which the data are available in 2010-16 with income levels similar to post-communist countries or higher.
